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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MURRAY 
CO. , a 
JOHN V. 
BENSON, 
MURRAY 
CO., a 
GEORGE 
FIRST THRIFT & LOAN ) 
corporation, ) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
vs. ) 
BENSON and EMILY SUE ) 
* 
Defendants, ) 
and ) 
FIRST THRIFT & LOAN ) 
corporation, ) 
Third-Party ) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
vs. ) 
P. RUFF, ) 
Third-Party ) 
Defendant-Respondent. ) 
Case No. 5380 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
MURRAY FIRST THRIFT & LOAN CO, 
Murray First Thrift & Loan Co. (hereinafter "Murray"), 
appellant herein, responds as follows to the Brief of George 
P. Ruff (hereinafter "Ruff"), respondent herein. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent has not taken essential issue with the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
« 
statement of the case set forth in appellant's opening 
Brief: That the instant action was brought by Murray 
against John V. and Emily Sue Benson (hereinafter "Bensons11) 
to collect on various notes and to foreclose on various 
mortgages given to it by Bensons and that Bensons, by way 
of both of defenses and counterclaim, asserted that they 
were excused from liability to Murray by reason of various 
negligent and/or wrongful acts of Ruff, the loan officer 
who had processed Murray's loan to them (i.e., lack of 
documentation of loans, forgery, fraudulent inducement of 
loans and failure to credit Bensons payment to their accounts). 
It further appeared from discovery that Ruff had breached his 
duty to Murray to obtain sufficient collateral for the Bensons 
loans and to keep accurate records and accounts of the sums 
disbursed to Bensons. Upon discovering Bensons defenses and 
questionable ability, Murray filed a third-party complaint 
against Ruff for indemnification of any judgment which Benson 
might obtain against it and for recovery of principal and 
interest on any loans which Murray might be unable to recover 
from Bensons (either by means of their successful defense or 
inability to respond) as a result of Ruff's wrongful acts. 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 1-4. Indeed, respondent does not dis-
pute Murray's characterization of the case as one in which 
only two conclusions were possible: Recovery by Murray from 
Bensons or from Ruff - "Murray's third-party claim [against Ruff], 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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therefore, supplemented its claim against Bensons and . . . 
could not be evaluated divorced from Murray's claims against 
Bensons.11 Id. , p.4. 
The action was settled on the day of trial by 
Bensons agreeing to transfer certain real property - which 
represented the great majority of their total assets - to 
Murray. At the moment the settlement was concluded, it was 
impossible to determine whether Murray had been made whole 
by that settlement; that could be determined only after the 
property had been liquidated. Murray therefore moved the 
Court that its claims against Ruff be dismissed without pre-
judice because "[Murray] will not know until we have liquidated 
the Benson property, whether and to what extent Murray has 
been injured by the apparent defalcation of Mr. Ruff." March 
9, 1976 Proceedings, P. 33. Respondent's only answer to that 
motion was the unverified and unsubstantiated statement by 
Mr. Cassity, his attorney, that "I have almost unbelievable 
expense" and that - in some way which Mr. Cassity did not dis-
close - Ruff would be prejudiced if the case was not tried 
immeidately. Id., pp. 33-34. 
There is no dispute as to the following: 
1. Bensons last-minute decision to settle made it 
impossible to determine, at the time set for trial, whether 
Murray would need, or would be entitled to, additional re-
covery from Ruff in order to be made whole. 
-3-
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2. The cost of a potentially unnecessary trial to 
Murray - and, for that matter, to all concerned - would be 
substantial. 
3. If, after liquidation of the Benson settlement, 
Murray had been permitted to proceed by a new action against 
Ruff, all discovery previously taken could have been used in 
the later case (UTAH R. CIV. p. 32(a)(4)) and only additional 
expense which Ruff would have incurred as a result of the 
,!false start11 on the date originally set for trial would have 
been the costs incurred by his counsel's appearance in St. 
George and incidental expenses - which easily could have been 
reimbursed to him as a condition of re-filing, if the Court 
had deemed that appropriate. 
4. Neither Ruff nor his attorney offered any evi-
dence to the trial court that Ruff would be prejudiced or dis-
commoded in any way (other than that described above) by a 
dismissal without prejudice. As a practical matter, the effect 
upon Ruff of a dismissal without prejudice would have differed 
little from that of a change in trial setting; the case against 
him simply would have come forward at a later date. 
• } 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION IN DENYING MURRAY'S 
MOTION FOR DISMISSAL WITHOUT 
PREJUDICE. 
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The question presented by this case is stated as 
follows: May a court properly deny a motion for dismissal 
without prejudice when a new development (in this instance, 
the Bensons settlement) creates a substantial likelihood that 
the action will be rendered moot and the only potential pre-
judice to the opposing party consists of obviously reimbursable 
expenditures? 
The above question, which never has been put to this 
Court, was squarely presented in Alamance Industries, Inc. v. 
Filene's, 291 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1961). In that case, a patent 
infringement action, the pending controversy appeared headed 
for resolution as part of a broader action pending in another 
judicial district. Plaintiff moved for dismissal without 
prejudice which the trial judge denied. The judge's view of 
the matter was: 
"...When you come here, you come here to a 
judge that disposes of business promptly for 
the public interest regardless of the private 
interests. I am not going to have a case -
I donft care what any other judge has - which 
lasts on my docket an inexcusably long period 
of time.... You have gotten the defendant to 
spend money to get a lawyer.11 
Id. at 144. The Court of Appeals found the trial court to 
have abused its discretion: 
Apparently what principally lay behind the 
district court's determination to try the case 
is to be found in its remark, made at the first 
hearing, that the "public interest11 of not having 
a case lie on its docket for fourteen months must 
control "regardless of private interests.ff We 
_^-
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cannot accept this statement either as 
the formulation of a generally applicable 
principle or as a proper criterion for the 
disposition of this particular case. Courts 
exist to serve the parties, and not to serve 
themselves, or to present a record with re-
spect to dispatch of business. Complaints 
heard as to the law's delays arise because 
the delay has injured litigants, not the 
courts. For the court to consider expedi-
tion for its own sake "regardless" of the 
litigants is to emphasize secondary consi-
derations over primary. 
...Nothing was to be gained by a ... 
trial...which could have been entirely 
obviated.... 
...Whether, and on what terms, a dis-
missal without prejudice may be granted, is 
a matter left initially to the trial court's 
discretion. [Citations omitted.] but that 
does not excuse the failure to exercise any 
discretion [Citations omitted.] or save from 
reversal an unpermitted exercise. We have 
already expressed our belief that the court 
did not even purport to exercise discretion. 
But were we to assume that it did, the reasons 
given - that [plaintiff] had brought the suit, 
and obliged the defendant to employ counsel 
to file an answer - were patently insufficient. 
These were merely a recitation of the very cir-
cumstances that call the rule into play. Some-
thing else was needed, and we find nothing else 
present. By the dismissal offered [defendant] 
would be protected [by curative conditions]. 
Id. at 146-147. (Emphasis added.) 
The instant case is closely analogous to Alamance 
there appears to be no case even remotely analogous to this 
one which supplies a contrary result. 
Respondent has offered no authority - nor, indeed, 
any reason - which could justify the trial court's action. 
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Respondent urges that this Court regard Butler v. Denton, 
150 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1945) and Emmco Ins. Co. v. Walker, 
57 N.M. 525, 260 P.2d 712 (1953) as supporting affirmance. 
Respondents' Brief P.7. However, no facts comparable to 
those existing in Alamance or in the instant case were demon-
strated in Butler and dismissal was ordered in Emmco on the 
express finding that plaintiff had not diligently prepared 
for trial. 260 P.2d at 714. Neither decision has any appli-
cation here. 
At page 7 of the Brief of Mr. Ruff, it is argued 
that the trial court's denial of Murray's motion was by reason 
of the !f[a]dvanced state of proceedings", citing Paturzo v. 
Home L. Ins. Co., 503 F.2d 333 (4th Cir. 1974) and Shaffer v. 
Evans, 263 F.2d 134 (10th Cir. 1958). Br., p. 8. 
Neither case is analogous to the present action. In 
Paturzo, the only reason apparently given for plaintiff's motion 
to dismiss without prejudice was his desire to proceed by a 
newly filed class action in which he had demanded a jury trial 
(he had waived his right to jury trial in the pending action) 
(503 F.2d at 335-336); in Schaffer, the Court of Appeals 
found that "no reason prejudicial to [plaintiff's] substantive 
rights was suggested" in support of the motion for dismissal 
without prejudice. 263 F.2d at L35. 
Plaintiff appears to cite the cases of Cincinnati 
-7-
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Traction Co. v. Pullman Standard Car Mfg. Co., 25 F. Supp. * 
322 (D. Del. 1938) and Roth v. Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co., 
5 FED. R. SERV. 41 (S.D. Ohio 1942) as somehow justifying 
the trial court's action by reason of Ruff's purported 
expenses incurred to date. Br., p. 9. In fact, the court 
in Cincinnati Traction denied plaintiff's motion for leave to 
amend on the ground that no need whatever had been demon-
strated for dismissal without prejudice; the District Court 
deciding Roth, which apparently believed that it could impose 
4 
no curative conditions beyond "a few dollars by way of costs", 
simply misunderstood its powers to fashion appropriate condi-
tions to a dismissal without prejudice. Respondent also urges, 
4 
at page 10 of the Brief, in reliance upon Golconda Petroleum 
Corp. v. Petrol Corp., 46 F.Supp. 23 (S.D. Cal. 1942), that a 
dismissal without prejudice would damage Ruff by delaying a 
final resolution of this controversy. However, no such pre-
judicial injury to Ruff was urged or demonstrated to the trial 
court. Indeed, Mr. Ruff is a defendant or third-party defen-
dant in two much larger actions arising from wrongdoing in his 
employment with Murray and had pled guilty to filing charges 
in connection therewith. The effect of a one man lawsuit against ^ 
this admitted felon hardly could prejudice him substantially. 
The balance of respondent's Brief (pp. 11-15) is more 
oratory than a discussion of applicable legal authorities. He * 
urges at pp. 11-12, that the fact that appellant did not propose 
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specific curative conditions to the trial court (which 
indicated no interest in such conditions) somehow excused 
the court from considering such conditions and exercising 
its discretion in the matter is devoid of any support in 
reported cases. Respondent's final argument, at pp. 12-15, 
that a motion for dismissal without prejudice in order to 
prevent a rather lengthy trial for damages which might have 
been rendered moot by the Bensons settlement would be "not 
sufficiently compelling" to justify the trial court's indul-
gence simply does not make sense. It is difficult to imagine 
a more "compelling" reason for dismissal without prejudice. 
Thus avoidance of superfluous litigations. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the decisions of 
the Court below should be reversed and remanded for dismissal 
without prejudice. 
Submitted this /y'^day of March, 1977. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Licarc 
John A. Snow 
Attorneys for Appellant 
141 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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